AN ANALYSIS OF “SELF” CONCEPT IN B. F. SKINNER’S TEXTS

Abstract

Skinner’s scientific project of psychology, based on Radical Behaviorism philosophy, arises in opposition to psychologies centered on the concept of the initiating self. However, the objections of the author do not seem to imply in abandoning the conception of self in his work. The purpose of this article is to make explicit some meanings of the notion of “self” circumscribed to the Skinnerian text, which are not restricted to his criticisms of the idea of the initiating self. The “self” is understood as a verbal repertoire that describes the body and the behavior of the individual, being constructed in social contingencies, through questioning made by the members of the verbal community, which allowed the individual to turn to himself/herself. Thus, in Radical Behaviorism the notion of “himself/herself” can only be understood in the context of verbal social contingencies; there is no pre-existing “I” to verbal behavior. “Self” can also be defined as complex verbal repertoire, characterized by a series of other verbal behaviors (self-observation, self-description, self-knowledge, self-control, self-government, self-editing) that help create and maintain “himself/herself”. As we proceed, then, for the description of these different behavioral repertoires that make up the “self”, there is an increasingly active “self”, without this activity being clarified by the notion of an initiating agent. In short, there is no split between “self” and behavior in Radical Behaviorism; therefore, the notions generally attributed to the initiating self (e.g., consciousness, self-esteem, thinking) can be clarified in terms of examination of behavior and verbal social contingencies.Key words: self; initiating self; Radical Behaviorism; verbal behavior; activity